I am an assistant professor of philosophy at Claremont McKenna College. You can email me at rbasu@cmc.edu.

​The central theme of my work is that when it comes to what we should believe, morality is not voiceless. What we owe each other is not just a matter of what we do or what we say, but also what we believe. 

​You can read more about my work in this short Aeon article, "To avoid moral failure, don’t see people as Sherlock does".

​If you came looking for the dog, you can find pictures of her here.​

Publications

1. “A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging”, in Applied Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.
2. “The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?”, in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, eds. Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva. Routledge. 2020.
3. “Radical Moral Encroachment: The Moral Stakes of Racist Beliefs”, Philosophical Issues 29(1):9-23. 2019.
4. “The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs”, Philosophical Studies 176(9):2497–2515. 2019.
5. “What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other”, Philosophical Studies 176(4):915-931. 2019.
6. “Doxastic Wronging”, in Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, eds. Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath. Routledge, pp. 181-205. 2019. (co-written with Mark Schroeder)
7. “Can Beliefs Wrong?”, Philosophical Topics 46(1):1-17. 2018.

Invited work in progress

1. A paper on moral encroachment and theories of justification for Doxastic and Propositional Justification (eds. Luis Oliveira and Paul Silva, Routledge)
2. A paper on doxastic wronging and its various critics for Philosophy Compass
3. A chapter on the ethics of belief for the third edition of the Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (ed. Kurt Sylvan)

Other work in progress

1. A paper on doxastic wronging and norms of inquiry
2. A paper on varieties of epistemic oppression and skepticism
3. A set of papers on expectations (individual, parental, societal, and more) and how they wrong

Last updated: July 18 2020