If you came looking for the dog (or the new kitten), you can find pictures of both here.
I am an assistant professor of philosophy at Claremont McKenna College. You can email me at email@example.com.
The central theme of my work is that when it comes to what we should believe, morality is not voiceless. What we owe each other is not just a matter of what we do or what we say, but also what we believe.
You can read more about my work in this short Aeon article, "To avoid moral failure, don’t see people as Sherlock does".
I also have a short piece on why it's a problem that the internet never forgets in this short piece, "The Internet Never Forgets: How Google Shapes and Cements Our Identities".
- "The Challenges of Thick Diversity, Polarization, Debiasing, and Tokenization for Cross-Group Teaching: Some Critical Notes", in NOMOS LXVI: Civic Education in Polarized Times, eds. Eric Beerbohm and Elizabeth Beaumont, NYU Press. Forthcoming.
- "The Ethics of Expectations", provisionally set to appear in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (ed. Mark Timmons).
- "The Importance of Forgetting", Episteme. Forthcoming.
- "Risky Inquiry: Developing an Ethics for Philosophical Practice", Hypatia. Forthcoming.
- "Belief", The Philosopher 110(2):7-10. 2022.
- “A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging”, in Applied Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey. Oxford University Press. 2021.
- “The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?”, in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, eds. Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva. Routledge. 2020.
- “Radical Moral Encroachment: The Moral Stakes of Racist Beliefs”, Philosophical Issues 29(1):9-23. 2019.
- “The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs”, Philosophical Studies 176(9):2497–2515. 2019.
- “What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other”, Philosophical Studies 176(4):915-931. 2019.
- “Doxastic Wronging”, in Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, eds. Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath. Routledge, pp. 181-205. 2019. (co-written with Mark Schroeder)
- “Can Beliefs Wrong?”, Philosophical Topics 46(1):1-17. 2018.
Upcoming talks and conferences:
- UNC Chapel Hill, York University, Washington University at St. Louis, University of Surrey, Arizona State University, University of Antwerp, Inquiry Work-In-Progress Group
Last updated: Aug 26 2022