If you came looking for the dog (or the new kitten), you can find pictures of both here.​

I am an assistant professor of philosophy at Claremont McKenna College. You can email me at rbasu@cmc.edu.

​The central theme of my work is that when it comes to what we should believe, morality is not voiceless. What we owe each other is not just a matter of what we do or what we say, but also what we believe. 

​You can read more about my work in this short Aeon article, "To avoid moral failure, don’t see people as Sherlock does".

I also have a short piece on why it's a problem that the internet never forgets at the aptly titled, "The Internet Never Forgets: How Google Shapes and Cements Our Identities".

Publications

1. "The Ethics of Belief", in Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd Edition, eds. Kurt Sylvan, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa and Jonathan Dancy, Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming.
   
2. "The Ethics of Expectations", in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 13, ed. Mark Timmons, Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.
   
3. "Syllabus Design and World-Making", in The Art of Teaching, ed. Brynn Welch, Bloomsbury. Forthcoming.
   
4. "The Challenges of Thick Diversity, Polarization, Debiasing, and Tokenization for Cross-Group Teaching: Some Critical Notes", in NOMOS LXVI: Civic Education in Polarized Times, eds. Eric Beerbohm and Elizabeth Beaumont, NYU Press. Forthcoming.
5. "Risky Inquiry: Developing an Ethics for Philosophical Practice", Hypatia 38: 275-293. 2023.
   
6. "Morality of Belief II: Three Challenges and An Extension", Philosophy Compass 18(7): 1-9. 2023.
7. "Morality of Belief I: How Beliefs Wrong", Philosophy Compass 18(7): 1-10. 2023.
8. "The Importance of Forgetting", Episteme 19(4):471-490. 2022.
   
9. "Belief", The Philosopher 110(2):7-10. 2022.
10. “A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging”, in Applied Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey. Oxford University Press. 2021.
11. “The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?”, in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, eds. Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva. Routledge. 2020.
12. “Radical Moral Encroachment: The Moral Stakes of Racist Beliefs”, Philosophical Issues 29(1):9-23. 2019.
13. “The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs”, Philosophical Studies 176(9):2497–2515. 2019.
14. “What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other”, Philosophical Studies 176(4):915-931. 2019.
15. “Doxastic Wronging”, in Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, eds. Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath. Routledge, pp. 181-205. 2019. (co-written with Mark Schroeder)
16. “Can Beliefs Wrong?”, Philosophical Topics 46(1):1-17. 2018.

Upcoming talks and conferences:

• UC Irvine, Cambridge, Institute of Philosophy, Central APA, Pacific APA, Bowdoin College, The Ohio State University
  

Last updated: Sept 25 2023