I am an associate professor of philosophy at Claremont McKenna College. You can email me at [email protected].

My research focuses on questions that arise at the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of race. In particular, I argue that when it comes to what we should believe morality is not voiceless. What we owe each other is not just a matter of what we do or what we say, but also what we believe.

Over the course of several publications I've argued for the dual claims that beliefs by themselves can wrong (doxastic wronging) and that moral considerations rightly affect our judgments about when evidence is enough evidence to justify belief (moral encroachment). My work's been recognized with a Mark Sanders Foundation Prize, national research grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2024, I was awarded the Glenn R. Huntoon Award in Superior Teaching on the basis of a vote of the entire student body for outstanding work in the classroom.

A full list of academic publications, peer reviewed journal articles and invited book chapters, is below. Some more public-facing pieces include "To avoid moral failure, don’t see people as Sherlock does" and "The Internet Never Forgets: How Google Shapes and Cements Our Identities".

(If you're looking for pictures of the dog or the cat, you can find those here.​)

Publications

1. "Against Publishing Without Belief: Fake News, Misinformation, and Perverse Publishing Incentives", in Attitude in Philosophy, eds. Sandy Goldberg and Mark Walker. Oxford University Press. Provisionally forthcoming.
2. "The Ethics of Belief", in Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd Edition, eds. Kurt Sylvan, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa and Jonathan Dancy, Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming.
3. "Syllabus Design and World-Making", in The Art of Teaching, ed. Brynn Welch, Bloomsbury. Forthcoming.
4. "The Challenges of Thick Diversity, Polarization, Debiasing, and Tokenization for Cross-Group Teaching: Some Critical Notes", in NOMOS LXVI: Civic Education in Polarized Times, eds. Eric Beerbohm and Elizabeth Beaumont, NYU Press. 2024.
   
5. "The Ethics of Expectations", in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 13, ed. Mark Timmons, Oxford University Press. 2023.
6. "Risky Inquiry: Developing an Ethics for Philosophical Practice", Hypatia 38: 275-293. 2023.
7. "Morality of Belief II: Three Challenges and An Extension", Philosophy Compass 18(7): 1-9. 2023.
8. "Morality of Belief I: How Beliefs Wrong", Philosophy Compass 18(7): 1-10. 2023.
9. "The Importance of Forgetting", Episteme 19(4):471-490. 2022.
10. "Belief", The Philosopher 110(2):7-10. 2022.
11. “A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging”, in Applied Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey. Oxford University Press. 2021.
12. “The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?”, in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, eds. Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva. Routledge. 2020.
13. “Radical Moral Encroachment: The Moral Stakes of Racist Beliefs”, Philosophical Issues 29(1):9-23. 2019.
14. “The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs”, Philosophical Studies 176(9):2497–2515. 2019.
15. “What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other”, Philosophical Studies 176(4):915-931. 2019.
16. “Doxastic Wronging”, in Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, eds. Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath. Routledge, pp. 181-205. 2019. (co-written with Mark Schroeder)
17. “Can Beliefs Wrong?”, Philosophical Topics 46(1):1-17. 2018.

Last updated: Oct 1, 2024